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This thesis explores the Department of the Navy’s innovation initiatives to 
determine how to leverage social networks to enhance innovation inside the Navy. 
Using the results of a social network analysis that mapped and measured the 
informal Navy Innovation Network, and examining how other military branches and 
industry pursue innovation, this qualitative research seeks to identify gaps and 
redundancies in the current Navy Innovation Network. Furthermore, 
recommendations are proposed that provide a more effective and structured 
approach to capturing innovative ideas from Sailors and Marines to improve 
Department of Navy operations and policies. 
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With the U.S. military’s research and development budget stretched like 
never before, and our adversaries’ capabilities growing and maturing, the military 
branches face a conundrum. They need to exploit as many innovation avenues as 
possible to maintain their technological superiority while being more efficient. This 
thesis examines how best to use the findings of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab’s social network 
analysis of the Navy Innovation Network to develop a more sustainable and 
institutionalized approach to networked innovation across the force. 
Currently, there are both official and grass roots innovation programs in 
each branch of the military that draw ideas from the war fighter. Programs like the 
Defense Entrepreneur’s Forum (DEF), HATCH, ATHENA, Tactical Advancements 
for the Next Generation (TANG), and The BRIDGE capture new and innovative 
ideas from those on the front lines to improve the U.S. military. 
The ATHENA project identifies itself as “an initiative, founded in the Surface 
Community, focused on harnessing deck plate innovations to create a cadre of 
forward-thinking, creatively confident Sailors for the Fleet of tomorrow” (ATHENA, 
2015). The program accomplishes this goal by creating an open and casual 
environment that arms tomorrow’s fleet leaders with a creative confidence and a 
way to express themselves (ATHENA, 2015). 
The TANG initiative uses the design thinking process to revolutionize the 
submarine community’s advanced development group by focusing on the 
warfighter and his or her needs (Smith, 2013). In order to best support submarine 
sailors, the group targeted junior officers as well as E-6 and below who are subject 
matter experts with the latest commercial technology (Smith, 2013). 
The U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) designed The BRIDGE initiative to build 
and encourage collaboration and idea generation through “advancing education, 
enabling empowerment, stimulating connections, and spurring transition” 
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(Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "PACFLT Bridge-MD5 Boot Camp"). PACFLT 
wants to inspire creativity and support a continued culture of change, not to just 
relay ideas. (Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, "PACFLT Bridge-MD5 Boot Camp"). 
While this is not an exhaustive list, each of these entities is making 
significant progress towards capturing innovative ideas from the Navy’s sailors and 
officers, but each of these initiatives has limited reach and capabilities. This 
hinders the Navy’s ability to take full advantage of the knowledge and experience 
of its war fighters, who are eager to help make improvements to the Fleet. 
This work uses the exploratory research method to analyze previous 
innovation research conducted by the United States Navy and the United States 
Coast Guard, along with additional historical references, in an attempt to identify a 
more efficient method of leveraging formal and informal Navy Innovation Networks. 
Specifically, this thesis examines the lessons learned from the Navy’s 
ATHENA and TANG projects, the Coast Guard’s Innovation program, and other 
innovation initiatives. This investigation identifies factors that contributed to 
success in the past and gaps that hampered or prevented the exploitation of 
innovative ideas. Finally, recommendations are offered to provide more structure 
in order to better incorporate innovation. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Navy Innovation Network (NIN) consists of formal and informal 
collaborations that include the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Strategic Studies 
Group (SSGs), CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), The ATHENA Project, Task 
Force Innovation (TFI), the Naval Innovation Advisory Council (NIAC), and the 
BRIDGE. It also capitalizes on several social media groupings and innovation fora 
(both physical and virtual) that attract hundreds, if not thousands, of bright, 
motivated sailors and Navy civilians with creative ideas to share. While the Navy 
is cognizant of these groups’ potential, it struggles to better connect these 
individuals and groups, to cultivate ideas from them, and to translate those ideas 
from concept to prototype.  
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When attempting to innovate inside any large organization, a multitude of 
barriers can stifle progress (Hall, 2013). Denning and Dunham’s The Innovator’s 
Way explains these roadblocks by first acknowledging how certain kinds of 
organizational processes and different levels of individual skills can affect 
innovation inside an organization. These organizations require policies that 
encourage and reward new ideas, but they also need personnel with basic 
innovation skills. If either of these components is missing, innovative ideas will not 
flow smoothly, if at all (Denning, Dunham & Brown, 2012). The Navy has its own 
roadblocks, as former President Franklin D. Roosevelt acknowledged, “to change 
anything in the Navy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right 
and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the 
damn bed just as it was before you started punching” (Neal, 2004). In order to 
change the organization, an accepting culture and a supporting process need to 
be in place or needs to be adopted. Laszlo Bock, senior vice president of Google’s 
People Operations, further explains that giving employees the ability to voice their 
ideas is a key factor in organizational effectiveness, quality decisions, and 
employee performance (Bock, 2015).  
Encouraging large cultural shifts in the Navy that reward the behaviors 
frequently associated with innovation is not easily achieved in a short period of 
time. Where examples of these shifts do exist, crisis often forced their adoption. 
For instance, after the loss of the nuclear submarine USS Thresher, the Navy 
instituted the Submarine Safety Program (SUBSAFE), a sweeping quality 
assurance program that included safety requirements and manufacturing 
accountability (Sullivan, 2003). Smaller, more incremental changes are more 
common, but even these often take years to be implemented institutionally. Mohan 
(2013) expounds upon this in his thesis by noting how infrequently major 
breakthroughs occur. These groundbreaking innovations are more often the result 
of numerous, incremental advances, the small benefits of which supported a larger 
goal (Mohan, 2013). 
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Mohan (2013), with the assistance of Chandy and Tellis (1998), discusses 
two ends of an innovation spectrum. Using existing product as a baseline, those 
innovations that principally involve new technology and provide a significant 
increase in customer benefits represent a radical innovation. At the other end of 
the spectrum would be incremental technological changes that provide a minor 
increase in benefits (Mohan, 2013). Mohan (2013) further cites Garcia and 
Calantone (2002) who suggest that a simple radical versus incremental 
dichotomization does not adequately capture the various levels of innovation, 
some of which fall in between radical and incremental. 
In order for an innovative idea to produce tangible results, there must be a 
willingness to take calculated risks and to accept failure. Encouraging risk is an 
essential avenue for innovation to proceed from ideas to implementation (Eriksen, 
2015). Christo Eriksen’s thesis further explains this through an examination of firms 
in Silicon Valley (2015). Inventors operate in a risk-tolerant ecosystem that top 
universities and leading businesses support. Social, institutional, and political 
structures and policies promote low formalization, low centralization, competition, 
and a sense of urgency to encourage innovation and to get new ideas to the market 
(Eriksen, 2015). 
B. PREVIOUS RELATED RESEARCH 
This thesis builds upon research previously undertaken by students of the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in the areas of social network analysis 
(Woodham, 2016), design thinking (Johnston, 2014), and organizational change 
management (Kluckhuhn, 2008). Student theses using these disciplines have 
addressed various factors that either directly contribute to the innovation process 
or describe how certain initiatives have accelerated the innovation process. There 
are three theses that are specifically germane to this document: Christopher 
Cannon’s A case study of project ATHENA: tactical level technological innovation 
aboard the USS Benfold, Kevin Johnston’s A case study of introducing innovation 
through design, and Christopher Kluckhuhn’s An examination of four successes in 
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the Coast Guard's innovation program and implications for innovation within 
Homeland Security. These are further considered in the literature review. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
When considering social networks and their implications, it is important to 
characterize the relationships and attributes and connect network members or 
agents. Kadushin (2012) defines a network as “a set of objects (called nodes) and 
a mapping or description of relations between the objects/nodes.”  
Networks exist in a variety sizes, shapes, and configurations. They can 
consist of as few as two nodes, with scale-free networks that are limitless. 
(Kadushin, 2012). 
This thesis explores how the various networks inside the Navy (personnel, 
ships, squadrons, fleets, etc.) currently attempt to assist the Navy’s goal of 
innovation. Through the examination of the case studies and other resources, this 
thesis suggests how the Navy can better utilize its social network to make its 
innovation efforts more agile. 
D. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze previous innovation case studies 
and research to identify best practices used by commands to create a culture of 
innovation, and to develop a Navy strategy for sustaining innovation that leads to 
rapid prototyping and Fleet integration. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to address a gap in previous research, which has not fully 
explored the value of formal and informal social networks in the military as engines 
for innovation or the means to institutionalize a pathway from innovation to Fleet 
integration. The following two research questions will be addressed within the 
context of the Navy Innovation Network: 
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How can the Navy more effectively bridge together individuals and clusters 
within the social network of Navy innovators? 
What process improvements can be made to encourage wider participation 
in the Navy Innovation Network by providing a clear pathway to implement 
change? 
F. RESEARCH METHOD, PROPOSED DATA, OBSERVATION, AND 
ANALYSIS METHODS 
This thesis employs a qualitative, exploratory research approach. It 
examines existing case studies, current literature, previous research, and current 
social network mapping and analysis. Using the exploratory research method 
enables the interpretation of data and results from multiple case studies. 
Conclusions may then be drawn through inductive reasoning. 
G. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research will focus on how best to use the findings of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Common Operating Environment (CORE) Lab’s social 
network analysis of the Navy Innovation Network to develop a more sustainable 
and institutionalized approach to networked innovation across the Force. By 
capitalizing on the ideas and expertise found inside the NIN, the Navy would have 
access to novel solutions to problems currently plaguing it today and in the future, 
better contact with subject matter experts working inside and outside of the service, 
and better cost savings through the utilization of design thinking and rapid 
prototyping. Greater employment of the NIN, and ideas cultivated from it, will also 
encourage more sailors to share their ideas, to participate in the network, and to 
feel they have a voice in the systems they operate. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Grass-roots organizations like the Defense Entrepreneur’s Forum (DEF), 
ATHENA, and others grow in popularity and numbers daily because they provide 
a forum and a supportive network of peers (Lynch, 2017). Members want to 
improve their communities of interest with their ideas (DEF, 2017). Retired Admiral 
and previous Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Michael Mullen and other key 
Service leaders recognize this desire to contribute to the improvement our military 
as a national treasure (Mullen, 2018). With each service branch facing dynamic 
challenges that require imaginative solutions, empowering these organizations 
and innovation is imperative (Mullen, 2018). These independent thinkers’ 
revolutionary, and sometimes disruptive, ideas may offer solutions to complex 
problems.  
Many of those sailors and Navy civilians who choose to participate in the 
innovation programs deal daily with the problems they are attempting to solve. 
These are the subject matter experts, the “doers,” the “fixers,” the ones relied upon 
to ensure mission success (Cannon, 2014). Their duty stations afford them a 
unique vantage point and sense of urgency, since they are often personally 
affected by the problem. They do not have the luxury of observing the problem 
from a dispassionate vantage point and waiting five to ten years for resolution, 
correcting the problem is in their best interest. They make a broken or inefficient 
system work (Cannon, 2014).  
As early informal, collaborative efforts began bearing fruit, groups like 
ATHENA, DEF, and TANG, emerged, and the Navy took notice. These 
organizations are part of a network of sailors willing to offer creative technologies 
and approaches to improve the Navy’s effectiveness. The Navy has referred to 
them collectively as the “Navy Innovation Network” (NIN). 
While the Chain of Command hierarchy must be respected, the Navy 
recognizes that, as in industry, innovation can flourish through horizontal, informal 
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ties among peers (McRaven, 2017). The “informal network” leverages 
relationships with present and former shipmates, other divisions within the 
command, previous military members, and those with a commercial or academic 
interest in Navy innovation. Each of these can bring their professional experiences 
to bear so that problems and opportunities are properly defined, viable ideas can 
be presented, and the most likely candidates can be pursued.  
With every branch of service attempting to maintain an advantage over our 
adversaries, even while stretching their respective budgets, determining how to 
more effectively bridge together individuals and clusters within the Navy Innovation 
Network is of paramount interest. Specifically, it is important to identify what 
process improvements encourage wider participation in the Navy Innovation 
Network to implement change. 
A. SOCIAL NODES, TIES, AND THE TYPES OF NETWORKS  
The Navy Innovation Network is, “a network of [Department of the Navy] 
personnel working toward the shared goal of maintaining and advancing the 
operational advantages of our Naval Services” (Navy Innovation Network [NIN], 
2017). In other words, it is a system containing any combination of individuals, 
units, and groups interconnected by formal and/or informal ties used to share 
information that can contribute to advances in the US Navy. As with any other 
network, it has components consisting of nodes and various types of ties. 
A “node” refers to a specific agent that can represent an individual, group, 
event, or other network member. A “network” is comprised of nodes connected 
through ties of relationships.  
Using the Navy as an example, an individual sailor could represent a node. 
When viewing that sailor within a ship’s network and chain of command hierarchy, 
he or she is one voice of many that is sending and receiving information inside a 
particular division. At the same time, that division also functions as a node inside 
a specific department (e.g. the Navigation Division with the Operations 
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Department). Zooming out further, each department serves as a node within the 
ship’s network.  
Social Network Analysis (SNA) measures how these nodes and ties 
organize to form the structure of the network. Measuring the structure and nature 
of a network provides the means to compare its behavior with other networks 
(Porter, 2017). Nodes inside a network connect to one another through different 
types of “ties.” These connections can vary in strength and density, and they 
connect the nodes either directly or indirectly. The strength of ties is characterized 
as either strong or weak and direct or indirect. A strong tie is characterized by the 
frequency, depth, and quality of communication. Over time, these strong ties may 
have a normalizing effect on the nodes where each acts and thinks in a similar 
fashion. One of the most common sources of network connectivity is the 
phenomenon of homophily, in which those agents with like-attributes (similar 
background, beliefs, and interests) are attracted to others who share attributes. As 
a result, clusters form where like-minded individuals share strong ties with similar 
perspectives. Weak ties are the connections between acquaintances, distant 
relatives, or friends of friends. Where strong ties may create a normalizing effect, 
weak ties are disruptive. They are the harbingers of new information, different 
points of view, or truth tellers. Granovetter refers to them as “conduits bearing 
information and influence” (as cited in Kadushin, 2012 p.31). 
Indirect ties occur when two nodes have no direct contact with one another, 
but share a connection with a mutual third party. Density measures the number of 
ties divided by the number of possible ties in a network. It may be a rough indicator 
of the levels of trust, cohesiveness, social support, and the social capital network 
members share (Porter, 2017). Wasserman and Faust offered the following 
examples of ties: 
1) Ties of sentiment (friendship, liking, respect), 
2) Resource ties (business transactions, financial flows), 
3) Ties of association or affiliation (members of the same church or club), 
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4) Behavioral ties (communication ties), 
5) Ties based on geographic movement (migration, physical mobility), 
6) Ties based on status movement (social mobility), 
7) Formal ties (organizational hierarchy),  
8) Biological ties (kinship). (p. 18) 
Understanding the nature of ties within a network can provide insight into 
its structure and behavior. 
B. INFORMAL NETWORKS 
One characterization of networks is whether they are formal or informal. In 
most companies, formal networks serve as the skeleton for the organization, 
providing the business’ structure. By contrast, informal networks act like the body’s 
circulatory system, carrying everything the skeleton needs to survive (Krackhardt, 
1997). Mapping a company’s formal and informal networks may assist managers 
in not only identifying the symptoms of a problem, but also diagnosing its source. 
Ralph Stacey, an accomplished leadership and management author, 
describes informal networks as a variation of a Boolean network. Individuals 
connect to others both inside and outside an organization through chance social 
encounters. He further postulated that successful organizations find that 
innovation and creative ideas often emerge from areas of dynamic instability within 
the organization through informal networks (Stacey, 1995). 
Understanding an informal network’s dynamic is complicated, as David 
Krackhardt and Robert N. Stern (1998) concede in Social Psychology Quarterly. 
They used Miles and Randolph's “Organization Game” to evaluate how friendships 
can either enhance or hinder a group’s ability to function in times of crisis inside a 
company environment. The findings demonstrated that a significant proportion of 
influence and work is attributed to informal networks. Krackhardt and Stern also 
noted that few organizations attempt to harness informal networks. If not properly 
cultivated within an organization, informal networks can lead to inefficiencies or 
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even dysfunction i. The authors detailed how at-work friendships develop through 
proximity and the amount of interaction between individuals. 
1. Issues with Informal Networks 
Understanding how informal networks function, and how they benefit (or 
hinder) organizations is critical to an organization’s success. Managers, or 
“authorities,” often fail to recognize the impact of informal networks within their 
organizations. Those accustomed to a rigid hierarchical structure often view 
informal networks with skepticism or anxiety because of the often nebulous and 
ungovernable tendencies of informal networks (Cross & Prusak, 2002). These 
managers do not fully grasp how their subordinates’ interpersonal connections can 
benefit the organization, and some even lack accurate information about their 
personnel. Krackhardt (1997) comments that “although [managers] may be able to 
diagram accurately the social links of the five or six people closest to them, their 
assumptions about employees outside their immediate circle are usually off the 
mark” (p. 132). As a result, managers do not always understand how to interact 
with or utilize informal networks. Krackhardt expounded in his journal article that 
some attempt to enforce rigid rules for interaction among employees based on 
titles or positions within the hierarchy. Others attempt to place “moles” inside the 
departments to control the influence of informal networks. Not only do these 
attempts fail to cultivate more productivity, they actually reduce efficiency. 
“Ambiguity aversion has a detrimental effect on the performance of front-end 
innovation activities due to a suppression of decision-making comprehensiveness” 
(Mohan, 2013). Put more succinctly, had authorities invested the time to learn how 
these hubs (nodes that serve as connectors within clusters) and coalitions 
functioned, utilization of the informal network could help solve problems and 
improve the company’s performance (Krackhardt, 1997). 
A common characteristic of informal networks is that relationships are often 
formed through homophily, with members seeking ties with those who share their 
interests or who have attributes in common. Krackhardt and Stern found that there 
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was a greater flow of information between subgroups, more trust between them, 
and a greater spirit of teamwork because of their friendship/informal network links 
(Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). However, this apparent advantage can also be a 
disadvantage. Krackhardt and Stern found that such close relationships can 
benefit the specific subgroup through solidarity, but they can hinder the company’s 
overall productivity by creating an “us versus them” mentality, especially in a 
resource-constrained environment. They found that in times of crisis, organizations 
whose employees develop and maintain friendships between divisions (called the 
“optimal” group) instead of strong friendships inside the division (called the 
“natural” group) would be more successful. The optimal group performed better in 
the face of a dynamic crisis scenario. Additionally, the optimal group demonstrated 
less accusation and more job satisfaction than their natural group counterparts. 
Stacey explains that an organization’s changeability is directly linked to the 
diversity of self-organizing, informal networks (Stacey, 1995). 
C. PSYCHOLOGY  
In the 1940s and ‘50s, the psychologist Abraham Maslow postulated that 
individuals require certain basic needs to be met before they can pursue higher 
order needs (McLeod, 2017). Informal social networks are defined by the 
individuals and relationships that comprise them. Participants need to feel safe, 
valued in the group, and acknowledged for their participation and achievements 
(Cannon, 2014). Since this research will explore ways to better utilize social 
networks, the underlying factors that lead personnel to contribute and interact 
through informal networks must be addressed.  
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Figure 1.  Maslow’s Triangle. Source: McLeod (2017). 
A military member may meet his or her psychological and self-fulfillment 
needs met, but while at work, he or she may only have basic needs met (Figure 
1). Supporting higher-level needs by acknowledging collaborative, positive 
contributions may be critical to encourage involvement of personnel in the NIN. 
Research conducted by Laslo Bock, and feedback received from ATHENA and 
DEF participants, points to the importance of empowering teams and team 
members. The ATHENA Project case study offered specific feedback, anecdotes, 
and critiques from participating members. Two particular comments detail the “shut 
up and color” mentality permeating the Navy. Individuals are told where to go, what 
to do, how to do it, but never asked for their feedback or opinion (Cannon, 2014). 
Whether managers discount a person because of their duty station, age, or 
 14 
perceived experience, these biases stifle voices and restrict a member’s ability to 
climb higher on Maslow’s triangle.  
While some see the problem residing in managers who punish those willing 
to question the status quo (Fisher, 2018), other military professionals stated that 
one of the largest hurdles innovation faces in the Navy is the intense bureaucratic 
or technical resistance (Adams et al, 2017). This was illustrated when an unnamed 
US Navy captain criticized the USS Benfold’s innovation effort, because it 
permitted a non-qualified Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) to participate. The senior 
officer implied that the unqualified ensign should have focused upon his SWO 
qualifications instead of innovation (Cannon, 2014).  In order to encourage 
innovation and empower individuals, Krackhardt asserts that three of the most 
important steps are ensuring that every member’s opinion is respected, that every 
voice is heard, and that two-way communication exists (Krackhardt, 1997).  
D. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
To better understand innovation initiatives already attempted, three specific 
military case studies were evaluated. The first two case studies represent elements 
within the informal Navy Innovation Network. The final case study documented the 
United States Coast Guard’s innovation program. All of these are excellent 
examples of successful innovation programs with relatively flat organizational 
structures operating inside the rigid, vertical hierarchy of the military. Each 
illustrates that while there are smart, innovative individuals in the Navy who are 
willing to contribute, the institutional approach by which the Navy attempts to solicit 
ideas is, at best, insufficient.  
1. Project ATHENA  
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Cannon investigated the ATHENA project 
through the lens of organizational change management and design thinking. This 
case study dealt with an initiative to improve technological innovation at the tactical 
unit level (Cannon, 2014). 
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The project originated onboard the USS Benfold (DDG 65) after the 
Executive Officer (XO), Commander (CDR) Richard LeBron, USN expressed a 
desire to encourage his wardroom to think beyond what was “doctrinally defined” 
and suggest improvements and innovations on both procedural and policy levels. 
With the help of Lieutenant (LT) David Nobles, USN, the Benfold created the “Wiki 
Wardroom.” The premise was simple: the officers received one day off work to fix 
any problem facing the ship. The only catch was that each individual had to give a 
five-minute presentation describing a specific problem and his or her proposed 
solution, to receive the day off. 
From the start, a majority of the junior officers (JOs) aboard Benfold were 
engaged and wanted to contribute, despite the fact it required significantly more 
effort and time both during and after the workday. During the first meeting, 11 
officers made presentations. Nearly all dealt with ways to improve processes 
onboard the ship. The first meeting also revealed areas for improvement in 
subsequent meetings. These improvements included standardizing the 
presentation process and a peer ranking system. One major limitation LT Nobles 
and the rest of the wardroom noted was that once a great idea was identified, there 
was no process in place to advance it further.  
The Benfold’s second meeting, now dubbed the ATHENA project, invited 
the entire crew, as well as members of the University of Southern California’s 
Institute for Creative Technologies (USC-ICT) and representatives from other 
commands, to participate. The results of the meeting were not documented. 
However, the apparent success of the second meeting caught the attention of the 
Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) special projects arm, known as 
the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), and members of the Navy’s Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). 
ATHENA Meetings III through V continued to expand the project’s success 
and influence. Attendance continued to increase from 15 to 20 commands with 
over a dozen major civilian companies/institutions joining them. During the events, 
presentations were made for innovative problem solutions and military members 
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and civilians continued an open dialogue to bring concepts closer to 
implementation or further exploration. Additionally, LT Nobles provided feedback 
on previously pitched ideas. 
Evaluating the ATHENA project through the lenses of Organizational 
Change Management and Design Thinking, LtCol Cannon’s research 
demonstrated how a properly motivated crew could advance Navy innovation 
when given a fertile and safe environment. It also highlights some of the challenges 
faced by both the foundering members and the participants.  
2. TANG Forum 
In their master’s thesis at NPS, Lieutenant Commander Kevin Johnston, 
USN, and Captain Robert Featherstone, USMC, investigated the Technical 
Advancements for the Next Generation (TANG) forum in Pearl Harbor in which 
submarine officers from across the fleet participated in a design thinking 
conference (Johnston and Featherstone, 2014). The goal of the conference was 
to harness both the technical and creative potential of these officers and apply it 
to the implementation of new and innovative technologies. After the first forum, 
participants offered 11 inventive ideas to the submarine community to improve 
command effectiveness. Those assembled recognized the value of collaboration, 
but they also realized that implementing these solutions in a hierarchical system 
required skillful execution of change management. The forum required submarine 
officers of all ranks to work in small groups on problems facing the submarine 
community. Participants wore civilian clothes and used first names in order to 
promote a more horizontal working environment. Every effort was made to improve 
the manner in which commands and leadership utilize change management and 
design thinking theories. 
Johnston and Featherstone’s thesis explained how leaders in the Navy 
provide a “command vision” that describes a desired end state, charts a figurative 
course for their personnel to achieve that goal, and then holds their personnel 
accountable when they deviate from that direction. They opined that while this 
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authoritarian style works well for strict adherence to policy and procedure, it stifles 
innovation and creativity. Instead, they recommended, leaders should adopt a 
more “sense-maker” approach in providing guidance and insight to their 
subordinates. This approach “loosens the reins” and allows fresh ideas and 
different perspectives to flourish with less fear of speaking up. It allows leaders to 
convey trust at both the enterprise (squadrons to their COs) and unit (COs to their 
officers and crews) levels. 
Other traditional views of change theory challenged in Johnston and 
Featherstone’s thesis included the dependence on outside “change agents,” and 
the need for urgency, to effect change. They suggested that change could come 
from anywhere, if a disruptive-thinking person has the fortitude to speak and a 
receptive audience willing to accept some risk. While moving swiftly to enact 
change is often essential to overcome objections and inertia, the authors also cited 
research that suggested a “fits and starts” methodology. Instead of constantly 
innovating, a sprint-then-coast strategy may afford better results. This alternate 
strategy pursues the rapid innovation of technology, policies and/or procedures 
during the sprint phase and allows personnel to acclimate to change during the 
coast phase (p. 129).  
The DOD employs a rigorous systems engineering process in order to guide 
a project from concept development to functional design and fielding. It considers, 
among other things, the customer’s needs, the operating environment, costs and 
other functional constraints, and all associated systems that affect operational 
employment of the designed system (see diagram). It focuses upon work 
processes, optimization methods, simulation and modelling, and risk management 
tools. TANG, on the other hand, employed the use of rapid prototyping techniques 
where crude mockups were used to allow groups to share a common picture of an 
identified need and to explore ideas as well as potential problems. This path 
requires far fewer resources and a significant reduction in investments. 
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Figure 2.  Systems Engineering Diagram. Source: Kossiakoff and Sweet 
(2006). 
Johnston and Featherstone’s research recognized the importance of 
involving in TANG process the junior enlisted sailors who were actually working 
aboard the submarine. While these junior personnel may not fully grasp all 
engineering or in-depth aspects of highly technical or complex problems, they can 
help by providing an operator’s hands-on experience. These individuals often have 
insights of existing commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology that might offer a 
more cost effective and readily available alternative to replacing legacy systems, 
then having to design new replacements. 
Finally, employing lessons from both design thinking and change 
management, Johnston and Featherstone opined that working in a collaborative 
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environment can result in a superior product as well as in an enhanced user 
experience for all involved.  
3. USCG’s Innovation Program 
Kluckhuhn’s thesis explores the United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
Innovation program’s attempts to leverage USCG personnel to evaluate, and 
respond to, emerging trends (Kluckhuhn, 2008). The work acknowledges that while 
innovation provides significant benefits, innovation also requires investments of 
time and money that are often not available, and new ideas can be seen as a threat 
to the status quo. Progress on projects may not be readily distinguishable during 
much of its maturation, and the risks of the innovation failing to produce the desired 
results can scare decision makers into inaction or rejection. All of these things often 
result in ideas being undervalued. However, the USCG’s Innovation project started 
with $9.5 million of capital and used a loose support structure to nurture the 
creative ideas of its operational personnel. This gamble resulted in process 
improvements valued at approximately $300 million that enhanced numerous 
operational capabilities.  
As in the ATHENA and TANG projects, Kluckhuhn recognized the 
advantages of empowering personnel regardless of rank, flattening out the 
hierarchical structures of the groups, limiting bureaucracy, recognizing and 
accepting that failure is possible, and increasing both monetary and non-monetary 
incentives. He cited other research that found the majority of innovations 
predominantly come from a diverse population “on the front lines” who have a 
better understanding of the existing processes and new technology than those 
further removed. Kluckhuhn went on to categorize obstacles to innovation as being 
either political, external, or bureaucratic, but he identified the single biggest hurdle 
as a lack of adequate resources. He concluded that with the proper resources (and 
persistence), most other obstacles were able to be overcome. 
The USCG’s Innovation program, CG-0931, reports directly to the Chief of 
Staff of the Coast Guard, operates with twenty-two personnel at the headquarters 
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and twenty-four personnel dispersed throughout the United States. It is tasked with 
“supporting continuous improvement, business intelligence, innovation, and 
performance excellence” (Kluckhuhn, 2008). 
An innovation council, consisting of twenty-seven military and civilian 
volunteers who represent each of the USCG’s nine districts, meets quarterly to 
review innovation suggestions, decides how to distribute seed money, determines 
which ideas will win coveted awards, and helps transition field innovations to major 
USCG programs that warrant additional support. Council members also act as 
“connectors,” linking together individuals or groups working on similar projects. 
The twenty-four geographically-dispersed individuals, called Organizational 
Performance Consultants (OPCs), are selected based upon a person’s proven 
track record of success in multiple fields, and on their expertise in continuous 
improvement. OPCs are equally divided between government civilians and 
uniformed Coast Guard personnel. Civilian personnel are permanently assigned, 
while uniformed members rotate on four-year tours, preventing stagnancy. Beyond 
receiving specific training in consulting and facilitation, these individuals have 
earned degrees in business or mathematics. Typical OPCs hold advanced 
degrees in these disciplines and are encouraged to pursue further education in 
consulting and other related fields (Kluckhuhn, 2008). These OPCs are specifically 
tasked promote innovation by supporting teams working at the National Graduate 
School. They also serve as internal consultants for commands and facilitate the 
innovation process by helping units navigate bureaucratic processes. 
Kluckhuhn (2008) delineated the USCG’s five-step innovation process.  
(1) Idea Submission: All USCG members have access to the 
innovation database. They can review any past or present 
innovation project. They can request support for an idea. An 
attached form prompts them to define the problem or explain the 
idea they would like to address, to describe how the idea will 
address time and/or money that could be saved in solving the 
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problem, and to explain what assistance the member needs to 
support their endeavor. 
(2) Initial Review: Once the member submits the form, both 
headquarters and regional field council representatives receive an 
e-mail alert with a link to the submission. Upon an initial review, a 
reviewer is assigned based upon the member’s geographic location 
and the type of solution suggested. 
(3) Primary Review: After the initial review determines the proposed 
solution has potential, a primary reviewer gathers additional ideas 
needed to better define the problem and evaluate the idea. Once 
satisfied, the primary reviewer coordinates a more in-depth 
evaluation by experts. The goal is to determine viability of the 
innovation as expeditiously as possible, decide if the solution can 
be applied to any existing project, and determine how best to 
proceed. Primary reviewers then submit a formal report to the 
appropriate Innovation Council for ultimate disposition. 
(4) Classification/Action: The Innovation Council must determine how 
the proposed solution may impact the USCG. Once approved, the 
Council empowers the innovator to proceed with their efforts. 
(5) Final Disposition: Reviewed quarterly, project status and updates 
are discussed to determine whether additional assistance is 
required (p. 34). 
The USCG recognized that not all ideas yield a return on investment. These 
ideas however, are not seen as failures but as glimpses into the future. They 
remain in the database not only to show where the research stopped or hit an 
impasse, but also to inspire a different path to success for someone else. The 
OPCs routinely communicate with each other as well as with industry and 
government leaders at Innovation Expos. OPCs get to see what is currently being 
produced and to assess what related capabilities industry may have. This constant 
learning and networking can resurrect a stalled project. 
Kluckhuhn found that keys to the USCG Innovation program’s success 
included the partnership with the National Graduate School, voluntary involvement 
with private-sector firms, and the USCG’s “Trained Initiative.” This initiative states 
that Coast Guardsmen can freely deviate from standard procedures as needed to 
accomplish their missions. They accept accountability for their actions and 
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decisions, because they know their commands will support them provided they are 
in line with the USCG’s guiding principles (Kluckhuhn, 2008). With senior leaders 
embracing the program and protecting the OPCs from dissenters, personnel from 
diverse backgrounds and specialties contribute to innovation projects. This 
collaboration results in a powerful tool. 
Kluckhuhn observed that the program’s success was not without personal 
cost to some participants and leaders. These individuals expended an exceptional 
amount of effort and energy to keep the program functioning, often sacrificing their 
careers, marriages, and even their health because of legacy processes that are 
either inefficient or in direct conflict with a forward-thinking initiative. Kluckhuhn 
also identified a possible missed opportunity for broader application and effects.  
He noted that while the program reaches nearly every level of the Coast Guard, it 
is not coordinated within the greater department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
Coast Guard’s parent organization.  
Despite these shortcomings, the USCG program, along with ATHENA and 
TANG projects, proved that collaboration among diverse partners can lead to 
innovation success.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. EXPLORATORY RESEARCH 
This exploratory research analyzes previous case studies and incorporates 
social network analysis research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School for 
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Management). The goal is 
to answer the research question, “How can the Navy more effectively bridge 
together individuals and clusters within the social network of Navy innovators.” The 
principle reason for using this method was to gain a greater understanding of the 
current environment, understand how ideas present themselves, and to develop 
multiple potential solutions (Research Methodology, 2018). 
Defined as “an examination into a subject in an attempt to gain further 
insight,” the exploratory research approach allows for the further evaluation of a 
topic that has already been identified as having potential but with little or no 
previous data to refer or rely upon (Study.com, 2018). It relies on a review of 
secondary research including literature, interviews, and case studies. While 
exploratory research may not offer a specific, definitive answer to a problem, it 
provides additional analysis of qualitative data that can contribute to generalizable 
theories, conclusions, and the means to identify further research that may be 
required (Singh, 2008). 
The majority of the research cited in this thesis originates from case studies. 
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009 
p.18). A strength of using the case-study method rests in the knowledge gained by 
immersion in a real-world environment. Case studies can offer a more complete 
understanding of a research area by providing qualitative observations of the 
subjects involved. Case studies assist researchers in answering the difficult 
questions of “how” or “why” a social development or construct works (Yin, 2009). 
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Some scholars and researchers are critical of the case-study method. They 
view this type of research as overly interpretive, allowing for the possible 
incorporation of biased or prejudicial opinions. Furthermore, this approach lacks a 
controlled experimental design. Any one of these issues can skew a researcher’s 
results. Yin acknowledges that case-study research is one of the most challenging 
to accomplish successfully due to the concerns previously mentioned (Yin, 2009). 
Case study findings, however, may lead to more in-depth exploratory research.  
This research focuses on the Navy’s Innovation Network (NIN). The NIN 
consists of various individuals and groups who voluntarily communicate with one 
another to support and encourage innovative advancements to enhance the 
Navy’s effectiveness. These members’ included active-duty officers and enlisted 
from all branches, veterans from all branches, defense contractors, and 
researchers. At the time of this research, there were over twenty-four self-
organized and Navy-sponsored programs. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The following chapter will analyze several sources, platforms, and media for 
common traits that support, encourage, and empower innovation in both civilian 
and military organizations. It will also search for common barriers to innovation and 
explore why those barriers exist, and how civilian and military entities overcome 
these challenges. It will specifically look for these common themes in existing 
successful U.S. military innovation networks and successful innovation programs. 
A. COMMON POSITIVE TRAITS 
During the research phase of this thesis, some common positive and 
negative traits emerged from the case studies, observations, and theoretical 
postulations. It is important to note that while these characteristics appear in the 
investigation, the combination of traits is unique to the specific organization or 
entity. 
1. Team Organization (Flat Hierarchical Structures) 
The first building block of the ATHENA Project, the TANG initiative, and the 
USCG’s Innovation program was the empowerment of individuals by flattening the 
command hierarchy as much as possible. Flat hierarchies have characteristics that 
aid the innovation process. 
As the name suggests, a flat hierarchical structure is one where there are 
as few levels of management between the innovator doing the work and the 
ultimate decision maker as possible (Figure 3. This conscious decision to remove 
bureaucracy encourages communication and endows workers with a more active 
voice in the innovation and decision-making processes (Meehan, 2018). The 
desire of many of today’s sailors to have a positive impact is clear in each of the 
case studies. These warfighters often seek direct communication with those who 
design the equipment, tools, and systems they employ, but numerous roadblocks, 
including the vertical chain-of-command structure, stymie their efforts (Cannon, 
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2014). Because of this, few homegrown ideas and initiatives make it to fruition. 
Frustration with the process drives many of these innovators out of the services, 
to the commercial sector where innovation is better accepted and easier to sell 
(Bladen, 2016; Cannon, 2014; Kluckhuhn, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.  Hierarchical versus Flat Organizational Structure.  
2. Voluntary Participation 
The second building block used by the innovation programs was a 
concerted effort to encourage broad-based participation. Institutions like ATHENA, 
TANG, and the USCG’s programs are voluntary, and they thrive by bringing people 
with diverse backgrounds together to solve dynamic problems. Teams self-
organize to explore and answer a specific issue, and they demonstrate how 
informal networks draw information and ideas from other nodes and networks 
(Cross & Prusak, 2002; Kadushin, 2012). AthenaTHINK, a specific design-thinking 
workshop held at SPAWAR, for instance, serves as a communication hub linking 
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the warfighter to scientists (Baker, 2015). Linking these networks together through 
meetings and events, AthenaTHINK promotes collaboration through teaching, 
brainstorming, and design thinking (Baker, 2015). 
3. Design Thinking 
With a flat hierarchy and a voluntary creative outlet in place, the third 
building block used by the ATHENA Project, the TANG initiative, and the USCG’s 
Innovation program was to incorporate concepts like Design Thinking to develop 
innovative ideas (see Figure 4). Stanford University’s David Kelley describes 
Design Thinking as a human-based approach. This process encourages a free 
flow of ideas while considering how technology and other constraints affect the 
design (IDEO U, 2018). By bringing creative individuals from different networks 
together in a voluntary environment where everyone’s opinions are heard, design 




Figure 4.  Design Thinking Cycle. Source: IDEO U (2018). 
B. COMMON NEGATIVE TRAITS AND BARRIERS 
As with the common positive traits, there were negative traits that emerged 
in the research. While vertical hierarchies have an important place in the Navy 
thanks to their ample promotion opportunities and other benefits (Meehan, 2018), 
some of these same benefits hinder the innovation process. It is important to 
emphasize that neither the flat nor the vertical hierarchical approach is necessarily 
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bad. Neither guarantees an innovation initiative will thrive. This thesis only 
recognizes that the evaluated case studies featured flat hierarchical structures. 
1. Vertical Hierarchical Structures 
A vertical hierarchical structure is common among large organizations and 
is defined by a pyramid-like structure where there is little-to-no direct 
communication between the bottom of the structure and the top (Bonomo, 2016). 
Systems like these reinforce the traditional chain of command by endowing 
managers with authority and assigning clear and specific tasks with little ambiguity. 
Unfortunately, while this system supports good order and discipline, it also creates 
anxiety when changes occur (Cannon, 2014; Eriksen, 2015). 
2. Bureaucratic Issues  
The CNO and SECNAV have repeatedly challenged Sailors and Navy 
civilians to innovate. Junior officers and enlisted sailors want to contribute and 
make a difference, but the path to submit ideas is often unclear. Leadership (at all 
levels), lack of command support, excessive workloads, and non-standardized 
submission methods can stifle the innovation process.  
In the past, many in the Navy believed the only way to attain expertise and 
knowledge was through long years of experience. Many felt the school of life was 
the only accredited institution that conveyed knowledge and respect. This 
perspective asserts that those in command have all the answers as a result of their 
years of experience.  (Johnston, 2014). Today, Navy leadership recognizes there 
are other approaches more conducive to modern innovation (Johnston, 2014). 
Camaraderie, a shared culture, and being an accepted member of the Navy 
community are important to sailors, since trusting each other is essential for 
survival (Eriksen, 2015; Johnston, 2014). Nevertheless, this peer pressure to 
conform suppresses innovation and sometimes even a person’s willingness to 
speak up (Cannon, 2014; Eriksen, 2015; Johnston, 2014). This may contribute two 
related types of behavior: the “naysayer” and the “frozen middle.” 
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A “naysayer” is a risk-adverse decision maker or influencer. Officers and 
enlisted sailors can both fall into this category by failing to be open-minded when 
new ideas emerge, because it diverges from the currently accepted system. A 
naysayer may be risk averse to due fear or simply because the status quo or 
accepted approach is comfortable (Johnston, 2014). Naysayers operate in what 
Stacy (1995) characterized as a state of equilibrium, rather than embracing the 
innovation that can emerge from organizational instability and informal networks. 
This affront to the status quo often drives leaders to resist change through passive 
or active means (Eriksen, 2015). 
Idea rejection can come from anywhere, and from any influencer or decision 
maker, but middle management is often the most culpable. This group of middle 
managers is referred to as “the frozen middle.” This was demonstrated when USS 
Nimitz personnel attempted to change the manner in which zone inspections were 
conducted.  Being presented an apparently well-vetted plan, the Commanding 
Officer ordered it be instituted immediately throughout the aircraft carrier, but the 
“lower level middle management” resisted the idea and prevented its 
implementation (Eriksen, 2015).  
3. Idea Submittal Avenues 
As of February 2018, over two dozen different physical and virtual 
innovation hubs were contributing ideas to the Navy Innovation Network. There 
are a similar number of research locations (see figure 5), but despite all of these 
opportunities for moving innovation forward, determining how to submit an idea is 
another key issue. For those sailors not fortunate enough to work within a 
supportive command, determining with whom to speak or where to seek 
assistance is not easy. 
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Figure 5.  Navy Centers of Innovation. Source: SECNAV (2018). 
Submitting an idea to Google is simple. A quick search returns instructions 
to contact the company (see screen shot), but “the Navy” is not as accessible. Most 
people now use internet searches or videos online to learn how to do things or to 
conduct research. This is especially true with the current generation. Searching 
topics like “Navy Innovation Center” and “Submit an idea to the Navy” returns 
articles about the Navy’s innovation vision and some previous programs, but there 
is no clearly defined process to submit an idea. Even searching “Navy Innovation 
Network” does not return a clear-cut submittal process. Unless a sailor knows 
about a specific innovation hub, he or she may lose interest in contacting the Navy 
and abandon his or her efforts all together (Cannon, 2014). 
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Figure 6.  Google Search. Source: Google (2018). 
Even if a sailor is able to locate one of the NIN hubs, this does not guarantee 
that node will have the ability to aid that individual. An ATHENA participant 
commented that while he enjoyed his experience pitching an idea, there were no 
members of industry at the event capable of commercializing it. Because of this 




The final issue to be discussed is the amount of work facing today’s sailors. 
This is a sensitive subject due to recent events with the USS Fitzgerald and USS 
John S. McCain, but Derek Mason’s NPS Master’s thesis reinforces what the USS 
Nimitz’s sailors suggested: they are overworked and undermanned (Eriksen, 
2015). Specifically, Mason (2009) found that the Navy Standard Workweek 
significantly underestimated the amount of hours sailors work and overestimated 
the amount of rest they receive during the week. While overwork can inspire sailors 
to be innovative to improve their quality of life, it can also strangle these efforts 
(Eriksen, 2015). 
C. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES 
Over time, the founders of the various NIN hubs discovered methods to 
encourage personnel to participate and overcome adversity. Generally, these 
methods address personnel because the majority of innovation hurdles involve 
people more than technology. Once again, it is important to note that methods 
developed by each organization in response to specific negative traits or barriers 
to progress encountered are necessarily unique to the organization. 
1. Involve/get Buy-in from the “Middle” 
One of the biggest threats to innovation comes from the naysayers and the 
frozen middle. Not only can they discourage creative minds on the ship, but they 
can also prevent those individuals from speaking up. Because of this, getting buy-
in from these individuals/groups is essential. The first step to accomplishing this is 
through education. Peter Senge, author of the Learning Organization, specifically 
states that people must employ “adaptive” learning, or the ability understand the 
problem and the solution, and be able to determine how to get there (Schein, 
2016). Naysayers religiously follow standard operating procedures, since the 
majority of these rules and processes are accepted as doctrine. In order for 
naysayers and those in the frozen middle to recognize change that is not directed 
from above as anything other than a threat, a thorough explanation, and possibly 
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even a demonstration of value, may be required. The second step is involvement. 
These middle managers bring a lot of knowledge and experience to the fight, but 
they can perceive change as a threat to their status. Seeking these people out as 
change agents and involving them in the innovation process, may reduce or 
eliminate those fears.  
2. Respecting the Inventor(s) 
When men and women join the Navy, they seldom do it for the money 
(Zimmerman, 2011). A 2011 thesis detailing the Navy’s Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM) confirmed this, when sailors chose desirable non-
monetary benefits rather than financial rewards alone (Zimmerman, 2011). The 
Navy incentivizes inventors financially through OPNAVINST 1650.8 (series), but 
the instruction falls short of offering intrinsic rewards and recognition innovators 
may prefer (US Navy, 2007). 
Today, good leaders realize that ideas involve multiple viewpoints and can 
emerge from anywhere, especially from the junior officers and enlisted sailors who 
deal daily with technical and policy deficiencies. (Eriksen, 2015). One way to 
recognize/incentivize an innovator was by providing that person time to pursue his 
or her project. These men and women are passionate about their projects. By 
assigning them to one of the two dozen labs, bases, or higher education locations 
where the Navy’s innovation programs thrive, they can participate with a team to 
see their project to fruition. Other incentivizes will be discussed in the 




V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The following chapter offers suggestions for the Navy to bridge individuals 
and clusters within the social network of Navy innovators more effectively. These 
methods share a number of commonalities with the USCG’s innovation program, 
but also incorporate elements from other successful initiatives. While the 
suggested steps focus on a technological approach to bringing people/nodes and 
organizations/networks together, it is imperative to recognize the importance of the 
other common problems mentioned in chapter four. To maximize the potential of 
the NIN, incorporation of policy and procedural changes are equally as important 
as the adoption of the proposed development of an Innovation Common Access 
Resource System (ICARS). 
A. THE ICARS SYSTEM 
As a result of the exploratory research cited earlier, the ICARS system is 
being proposed here as an application (app) with a Graphical User Interface that 
links historical documents, innovation databases, and fleet and industrial subject 
matter experts (SMEs) together with an institutionalized Department of Navy 
innovation team. The expressed purpose of this system is to encourage innovation 
throughout the Navy.  The proposed ICARS system is intended to encourage and 
facilitate innovation by first providing innovators increased access to information 
and knowledge, then to link these individuals to groups that can help them develop 
their ideas. This is a combination of several successful systems currently in use by 




Figure 7.  The Complete “ICARS” System 
 The Navy Innovation Network encompasses over two dozen 
separate organizations. While some personnel are members in multiple groups, 
creating weak times among them, ICARS seeks to consolidate these groups to 
improve communication, coordination, and interest in the innovation process. 
B. THE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE: INNOVATION TEAMS AND 
PHYSICAL HUBS 
1. Innovation Hunters 
The first step in the proposed innovation process that includes ICARS is to 
develop a corps of Innovation Hunters (IHs). Innovation Hunters are Navy sailors 
(officers and enlisted) whose mission it is to seek out innovations and innovators 
inside their functional or geographic area of responsibility (AOR). These individuals 
would serve as informal network hubs to help connect local innovators. IHs need 
to be renaissance personnel, having experience and accomplishments across 
multiple fields and disciplines with core understandings of Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM), as well as business. With that said these 
people must also be creative and resist institutional thinking. This creativity adds 
an A (Arts) to STEM, creating STEAM. Personnel in the IH realm need to 
understand how the Navy acquisition system works, so assigning a specific 
additional qualification designator AQD or Navy enlisted code NEC to Supply 
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Corps personnel would be the most likely path to implement such a sub-specialty, 
but other rates and designators could also apply. 
2. Primary Reviewers 
Once the IHs confirm that an idea appears viable, the innovator and his or 
her idea is forwarded to the primary reviewer (PR). In step two of this process, PRs 
gather additional information to more thoroughly vet the project, monitor the 
individual’s progress, and coordinate testing of the concept. These members of the 
innovation team further link industry and military SMEs to the innovator to ensure 
the project’s viability and ensure projects do not overlap. The PRs ultimate goal is 
to review innovative ideas as efficiently as possible to determine the feasibility of 
the projects. Once he or she is satisfied that the suggested concept will benefit the 
Navy, the PR submits his or her findings to the Innovation/Executive Council. 
3. Innovation / Executive Council  
The Innovation/Executive Council (IEC) consists of a quorum of military and 
civilian personnel from the various nodes within the NIN. Meeting quarterly, this 
group transmits innovation initiatives, demand signals, and information throughout 
the NIN, via ICARS. In step three of the process, this group also reviews 
innovations for duplication, funding, and/or forwarding to entities like the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), the Warfare Centers, NPS or other research facilities for further 
development and fielding. Finally, the IEC assists the DoN in rolling the new ideas 
out to the fleet to overcome resistance in the “frozen middle.” 
4. Locations 
In addition to the steps noted above in the innovation process, there needs 
to be structure.  Innovation Hunters and primary reviewers will have specific 
geographic and functional (warfare area) AORs.  The IHs will be located at fleet 
concentration areas so that they may reach Navy personnel across the Fleet. 
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5. Hierarchy 
A flat hierarchy is essential to promote collaboration and participation, and 
to limit bureaucracy. The less time required to submit ideas and receive feedback, 
and the more opportunity for collaboration and transparency, the higher the 
likelihood of an idea reaching fruition. 
 
Figure 8.  Hierarchy  
C. ICARS APP 
1. Access 
An essential part of ICARS is ensuring it is sponsored by the Navy. To 
accomplish this, the installation on all Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
computer systems is essential. Specifically, there will be an ICARS icon located 
on every desktop. Additionally, ICARS will also be available by utilizing a virtual 
private network (VPN), permitting remote access for unclassified projects. 
In order to access ICARS, every sailor, government employee, and 
contractor will register using an official email and ICARS administrators will assign 
a username. Once registered, an individual’s command or employer must verify 
the member’s identity and authenticate that individual’s email address. This does 
reveal the member’s username or whether the member utilizes ICARS; it merely 
authenticates that person’s identity. This authentication process recurs periodically 
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to ensure the individual’s contact information is up to date, and that his or her 
security clearance and access to government computers remain valid. 
To avoid the naysayer and frozen middle obstacles, ICARS will assign a 
username to maintain the user’s anonymity. At no time will a person’s rank, 
affiliation, or other identifying characteristics be available to other users. Innovation 
hunters (IH) and other ICARS administrators are the only people who can access 
this information. All those employed by the Department of the Navy (DoN) with 
computer access will be encouraged to use and contribute to ICARS. To 
accomplish this, these individuals will require training on the purpose and proper 
usage of ICARS by the local IHs. This will not only introduce the IHs to the units, 
but it will also alleviate any possible negative bias and more thoroughly answer 
any questions related to purpose or usage. 
2. Tracking and Statistics 
Every user is tracked in ICARS to determine how active the person is in the 
system and in what ways he or she contributes to ICARS. Further, other members 
can “like” ideas, comments, and suggestions. Data will be used for statistical 
analysis, including a determination of value based upon peer recognition. This is 
similar to a person’s Twitter “Klout” score (based on likes and retweets) that shows 
how much influence the idea has. Over time, the likes of a particular person’s 
comments also can suggest whether that person should be invited to serve as a 
member of the innovation team. Conversely, if a person is repeatedly reported for 
abuses of the system, tracking data will be used to determine whether suspension, 
expulsion, or disciplinary action should be pursued. 
3. Opening Screens 
After logging into ICARS, users will be required to acknowledge the 
classification level and the penalty for transmitting information that exceeds that 
level. This ICARS app should be installed on both the Non-classified Internet 
Protocol (NIPR) and Secret Internet Protocol (SIPR) networks, so that a wider 
range of ideas can be cultivated. 
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Once inside ICARS, ease of use, intuitive flow, and minimal clicks to submit 
an idea will further encourage participation. With this in mind, members with ideas 
to submit will be asked to make simple choices to properly categorize where their 
innovation belongs (see “main page” figure below). After determining the warfare 
and topic concentration area in which to enter the idea (see “subpages 1 and 2” 
below), the innovator will be required to write a brief description using a dialogue 
box (see “dialogue box” below). Before submitting, users must re-verify that 
whatever he or she is about to submit meets the classification guidelines. 
 
Figure 9.  Main Page 
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Figure 10.  Subpage 1 
 
Figure 11.  Subpage 2 
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Figure 12.  Dialogue Box 
D. SUBMISSION COMMUNICATION PATH 
The dialogue box submission will initiate a keyword search of two of the 
primary functions within ICARS: the historical documents and the innovation 
database. These functions will be explained in the next section, but the query will 
search for related work, lessons learned, or challenges encountered by the fleet. 
The search would also identify any previous innovation attempts or related 
research. Based on these findings, the individual who submitted the idea will 
decide whether they want to pursue their innovation further. Having a perspective 
of previous attempts to solve the problem will also allow the would-be innovator to 
better asses their own solution.  
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Figure 13.  Initial Communication Path 
Once the innovator determines that his or her idea is either a new concept 
or a way to restart a previous or related project, ICARS verifies the individual’s 
contact information then alerts the local IH (see “innovation pathway” below). 
Innovation Hunters will sit down with the individuals, listen to the pitch, and 
determine what action should be taken: the idea may be returned to the person for 
more information, submitted to the primary reviewer for further consideration, or 
rejected. Every step is logged in ICARS for transparency, to-do lists are transmitted 
to the innovator, and updates are logged in the database. Once the PR is satisfied, 
he or she submits the idea to the executive panel who determines its final 
disposition (see “submission process” below). 
 
Figure 14.  Innovation Pathway 
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Figure 15.  Submission Process 
E. COMPONENTS 
1. Historical Library 
Inside the ICARS program itself, there are four pillars, or database 
repositories: Historical documents, Innovation database, Fleet & Schoolhouse 
SME boards, Industry and Research SME boards (Figure 7).  The Innovation team 
has already been addressed, so four of these pillars will now be described in further 
detail.  The first to be discussed are the fleet’s historical documents. Official papers 
like Departure From Specifications (DFS), the various forms of Ship Alterations 
(SHIPALT), Casualty Reports (CASREP)/Casualty Corrections (CASCOR) 
provide innovators information regarding technical problems encountered and 
addressed across the fleet. For instance, the CASREP/CASCOR pairs explain 
details of a problem and how the crew overcame it. By reviewing problems and 
how these were resolved or mitigated, patterns may be discernible that inspire 
innovators to suggest additional courses of action or to design better systems. 
This portion of ICARS offers the greatest opportunity to win over middle 
managers. These individuals operate under tremendous pressure to ensure their 
specific systems, and by extension their unit, are mission ready. Often, they rely 
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upon their experience and intuition when technical publications fail to diagnose the 
root failure. By building this resource, middle managers can explore how other 
units resolved similar problems. ICARS also encourages collaboration and training 
by allowing junior officer and enlisted sailors to research problems and suggest 
remedies based upon previous experience and lessons learned. The ICARS 
historical database is intended to help middle managers better address problems 
they encounter in their workspaces while encouraging them to support innovations 
that address recurring problems fleet-wide. 
 
Figure 16.  ICARS – Historical Documents Explanation, Part 1 
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Figure 17.  ICARS – Historical Documents Explanation, Part 2 
2. Innovation Database 
The second pillar in ICARS to discuss is the collection, organization, and 
presentation of past and present innovation initiatives that emerged primarily 
through throughout the formal and informal Navy Innovation Network (NIN). This 
database will consist of past attempts and ongoing projects, a description of 
desired project outcomes, a log of what has and has not worked in each case, 
message boards for each project, and points of contact for those interested in 
contributing to the innovation effort or in seeking further information. 
In order to accomplish this, existing project/idea data from the various NIN 
need to be uploaded into a database and formatted. The resulting Innovation 
database would enable innovators to build upon what others have learned in the 
past (through trial and error). This dynamic, living Innovation database would then 
be maintained by the Innovation team. 
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Figure 18.  ICARS – Innovation Database 
3. Fleet and Industry SMEs 
The third and fourth pillars in ICARS to discuss are the Fleet & Schoolhouse 
SME boards and Industry and Research SME boards.  These databases contain 
listings, attributes, and contact information for both fleet and civilian subject matter 
experts. These subject matter experts represent years of experience and a depth 
of knowledge in their respective fields.  They are both sources of information and 
conduits for innovation development and implementation. 
In the Fleet and Schoolhouse database would be the military personnel who 
teach in the schoolhouses, train and evaluate the fleet at the Afloat Training 
Groups and at the squadron, work at the maintenance facilities, and in the various 
Warfare Centers and Naval research facilities. On the civilian side, these are 
technical experts from industry partners with vast experience in the both the 
Defense industry and the private sector. 
Having registered with ICARS administrators, SMEs can either choose to 
contribute to innovations already posted, or offer solutions for others to pursue. 
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These SMEs could also be selected to serve as a primary reviewer for specific 
projects. 
 
Figure 19.  ICARS – Fleet SMEs 
 
Figure 20.  ICARS – Industry SMEs 
 49 
F. CONCLUSION 
Today’s sailors routinely demonstrate that they want to make the Navy 
better, and when given the opportunity, their ideas have improved the quality of life 
for those affected. Unfortunately, these innovators are stymied by the current 
inefficient, and sometimes convoluted, process; disinterested middle managers 
who either will not help or actively block efforts; and an archaic compensation 
system that discourages inventors from submitting ideas. Additionally, the 
service’s current risk-adverse, zero-defect mentality stifles potential innovators for 
fear of failure. In order for the Navy to encourage this new generation of sailor to 
offer their concepts, the current systems and mindsets need overhauled. 
ICARS will assist the Navy’s innovation attempts through a multitude of facets. 
First, it more effectively bridges together individuals and clusters within the network of 
the Navy’s Innovation Network by providing a dedicated, structured, and organized 
path for innovators throughout the fleet to submit, inspire, and contribute ideas. 
Second, it will provide middle managers a dedicated troubleshooting and situational 
awareness resource that will reduce unit downtime, technical consultation time and 
expenses, and improve research and training opportunities. Finally, it provides the 
opportunity to expand beyond the Navy to allow innovators from all branches of 
service to interact and contribute, benefiting all of DoD. 
1. Recommendations and Future Research 
a. ICARS 
The first recommendation is to design, test, and field ICARS. In order to do this, 
the program itself needs to be coded to operate inside the NIPR and SIPR platforms. 
For the unclassified version, building a VPN access port will also need to take place.  
Big data collection and storage will also need to be addressed, as will 
system architecture to support machine learning and keyword search algorithms.  
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After this build is completed and ICARS is fully integrated in the fleet, 
expanding access to the rest of the DoD might ensure higher-level support and 
broader, more diverse collaboration, resulting in combinatorial innovation. 
b. Innovation Leadership 
In order to encourage innovation, Navy leaders should incentivize rather 
than punish responsible risk-taking to offset the current risk-averse culture that has 
developed over time.  Navy leaders at all levels (from major commands to work-
centers) need to encourage and incentivize innovative thinking, and this includes 
a willingness to take reasonable risks.  
c. Future Research 
ICARS has the potential to revolutionize the Navy’s innovation efforts, and 
as the Navy rolls it out, new qualitative and quantitative research opportunities will 
present themselves. Specifically, future researchers can observe and evaluate the 
program’s implementation. There is also an opportunity to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of the ideas presented versus the total investment. Finally, once the 
program is completely fielded, evaluating it at the five-year point will offer a realistic 
analysis of ICARS’ effectiveness and level of use. 
Determining the number and type of patents that result from ICARS and the 
Innovation process is a second area to explore. Previous patent research was 
limited to USMC personnel and resulted in a sample size too small to offer a 
statistically significant outcome (Bladen, 2016). By expanding it to either DoN or 
all of DoD, there is a higher likelihood of receiving significant results.  
Finally, a thorough evaluation of how junior personnel perceive their 
Command’s willingness to encourage their contributions to innovation should be 
quantitatively and qualitatively measured. The case studies cited in the Literature 
Review demonstrated that junior sailors were often reluctant to voice a different 
point of view. Questions regarding command support for inclusive innovation 
should be incorporated into the Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) 
surveys.  
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